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Abstract
A set of agents is organized in a social network, which conveys synergies in
two activities. Each agent has one unit of a resource to allocate between two
activities. We show that individual choices are shaped by Bonacich centrality
measures and an attractiveness multiplier. The latter, combined with the elas-
ticity of Bonacich centrality with respect to the intensity of interaction, drives
the sign of the network reaction to a modification of the costs of activities.
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1 Introduction
In many circumstances, individual behaviors depend on the choice of others in a ref-
erence group. This view is supported by a recent empirical literature that emphasizes
the role of social networks. Well-known examples of peer effects between neighbors can
be found in the workplace, education, job search, criminality, or research activity of
academics.1 Considering that individuals are organized in a social network, Ballester
et al. (2006) have shown that the magnitude of the peer influence exerting on an indi-
vidual may not be homogenous across the network. In their model, agents exert effort
in a costly activity that conveys synergies among neighbors. Under linear-quadratic
utilities, an equilibrium exists for sufficiently low level of interaction, and efforts are
related to a Bonacich centrality measure. The Bonacich measure captures the network
structure, and indicates how ‘central’ agents are in regard to their position on the net-
work. Indeed, more central agents on the network exert more effort. This result applies
when agents undertake one activity. However, individuals are often involved in mul-
tiple activities that use the same resource. For instance, students have to share time
between education and leisure, and professors between research activity and teaching;
farmers have to allocate lands between different plantations, etc. When the available
resource is scarce, activities are competing in its use. In this context, the network may
favor either of the activities in competition. This issue has not been addressed in the
literature.
To proceed, we consider a society in which each agent has one unit of a resource to
allocate between two activities 1 and 2. Agents are organized in a social network,
through which synergies transit between neighbors along the same activities.
First, this paper studies the impact of the structure of the social network on individual
decisions in terms of resource allocation. We show that equilibrium efforts in activity 1
are the sum of effort in autarky and the product of a Bonacich centrality measure by a
parameter, that we call Attractiveness Multiplier. The Bonacich centrality is associated
with a decay factor, which is in our context the ratio of the sum of synergies over the
1On networked peer effects in the workplace, see Mas and Moretti (2009), on education see Calvo´-
Armengol et al. (2009), on job search see Topa (2000), on criminality see Gleaser et al. (1996), on
research activity of academics see Goyal et al. (2008).
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sum of costs of effort. The attractiveness multiplier is related to the attractiveness of
activity 1 with respect to activity 2, taking into account both intrinsic preferences and
synergies. Importantly, this parameter is independent of the network structure. The
impact of the network centrality on individual effort in activity 1 crucially depends on
the sign of the attractiveness multiplier. When it is positive, more centrality on the
social network enhances the activity 1, otherwise network centrality fosters activity 2.
Second, we study the network response to a variation of the costs of activities. This
issue has been under-explored by the literature. Indeed, in the one-activity setting,
the response of the network is unambiguous. In opposite, in the two-activity context,
the network may intuitively favor either of the activities, making the response of the
network ambiguous. We then consider the effect of a variation of preferences or activity
costs on individual efforts, assuming without loss of generality that the exogenous shock
is favorable to activity 1.
When the shock affects preferences, the network responds positively to the shock, and
individual efforts in activity 1 increase basically more than in the absence of interaction.
We then consider a decrease of the cost of activity 1, or an increase of the cost of activity
2. Such a variation affects the intensity of interaction, and the network may react
negatively: following the shock, the variation of efforts are lower than in the absence
of interaction. The reason is that decreasing the cost of activity 1 admits two opposite
effects on efforts in activity 1: a direct effect, enhancing effort in activity 1, and an
indirect effect. Indeed, this generates an increase of the intensity of interaction, which
enhances centralities; since the network favors activity 2, this latter effect is favorable
to effort in activity 2. We examine how the network affects incentives. For clarity we
focus on the case in which activity 2 is relatively more attractive than activity 1.
We show that the network always reacts positively to an increase of the cost of activity
2. However, it reacts negatively to a decrease of the cost of activity 1 for agents whose
elasticity of Bonacich centrality with respect to intensity of interaction is relatively high.
This elasticity is increasing with the intensity of interaction, but it is non monotonic
with regard to link addition, or with regard to centrality (we illustrate the points by
the study of all 4-player connected architectures). Nevertheless, subsidizing activity 1
or taxing activity 2 is shown to induce always an increase of all efforts in activity 1,
even if the network reacts negatively.
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The article is organized as follows. Next section presents the model. Section 3
studies equilibria, while section 4 is devoted to the static comparative analysis. Section
5 concludes. The last three sections are appendices. The first one collects proofs, the
second presents some basic properties of elasticities of Bonacich centralities, the last one
studies Bonacich centralities and their elasticities on all 4-player connected networks.
2 The model
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be a set of individuals. Each agent has one unit of a resource
(time, space, money) to allocate between two costly activities, say activities 1 and 2.
The social network. Agents are organized in a social network. Formally, we introduce
the set G of all n × n binary matrices that are symmetric and with null diagonal
elements. A social network is then represented by a matrix g = [gij] ∈ G. If agents
i and j are social neighbors, we set gij = 1, otherwise gij = 0. We say that g ≤ g′ if
and only if, for all i, j, gij ≤ g′ij. We let di(g) =
∑n
j=1 gij denote the number of agent
i’s neighbors, or agent i’s degree, in network g. We let µ(g) denote the inverse of the
greatest norm of eigenvalues of g.
Utilities. Each agent is endowed with one unit to allocate between two activities. The
share of the resource that agent i devotes to activity 1 (resp. activity 2) is a real number
xi (resp. yi) in [0, 1]. We consider that agents’ efforts in each activity are proportional
to the share of the resource devoted in the related activity. Following Ballester et al.
(2006), utilities are linear-quadratic. We impose separability in activities:
ui(x, y; g) = a1xi − c1
2
x2i + a2yi −
c2
2
y2i + λ1
∑
j
gijxixj + λ2
∑
j
gijyiyj (1)
with a1, c1, a2, c2 > 0, and λ1, λ2 ≥ 0. Throughout the paper, we will interpret xi as
agent i’s effort in activity 1.2 The quantity λqxixj, q = 1, 2, measures the synergy
between two neighbors i and j with regard to activity q.
2This formulation encompasses perceived returns of effort. For instance, in the context of education,
Jensen (2010) shows that the returns perceived by individuals affect schooling decisions, and these
perceptions may be inaccurate. Interestingly, he finds some support for the hypothesis that students
underestimate the returns to education in part because they rely heavily on information on the returns
within their own community.
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Given that activities are costly, the resource may not be fully exploited if activity costs
are high enough. We assume that an isolated agent exploits the full resource, that is,
a1
c1
+ a2
c2
≥ 1. Hence, xi + yi = 1. Since externalities are positive, this also implies that
socialized agents fully use their resource. The equilibrium effort under autarky is easily
shown to be x0 =
a1−a2+c2
c1+c2
, and we assume that x0 ∈]0, 1[.
We define vi(x; g) = ui(x, y; g). Writing yi = 1 − xi for all i, the agent i’s utility
becomes:
vi(x; g) =
(
a2 − c2
2
+ λ2di(g)
)
+
(
a1 − a2 + c2 − λ2di(g)
)
xi − c1 + c2
2
x2i
−λ2
∑
j
gijxj + (λ1 + λ2)
∑
j
gijxixj (2)
When some agent increases effort in activity 1, she decreases effort in activity 2. Hence,
externalities are endogenous to agents’ effort levels. Basically, ∂vi(xi)
∂xj
= gij
(
(λ1+λ2)xi−
λ2
)
. That is, increasing agent j’s effort in activity 1 induces a net positive externality to
agent i only if the effort of agent i in activity 1 is larger than the threshold xe =
λ2
λ1+λ2
.
Second, ∂
2vi(xi)
∂xi∂xj
= gij(λ1 + λ2) ≥ 0. When some neighbor increases effort in activity
1, this reinforces incentives to invest in activity 1 (λ1). Moreover, due to resource
constraint, the increase of the neighbor’s effort in activity 1 mechanically decreases her
effort in activity 2, which reduces incentives to invest in activity 2 (λ2). In other words,
synergies cumulate.
We let γ = λ1+λ2
c1+c2
be the ratio of synergies over costs of effort, we call it the intensity of
interaction or equivalently decay factor. Throughout the paper, we assume that γ <
µ(g). This relatively low level of interaction guarantees the existence of equilibrium.
We define the quantity m = x0 − xe, that we call Attractiveness Multiplier, which
will play a crucial role in our analysis. It is positively related to the attractiveness of
activity 1. This parameter takes into account both intrinsic preferences and intensity
of synergies between neighbors. It is positive if strategic complementarities in activity
1 are sufficiently high with regard to strategic complementarity in activity 2, or if the
cost of effort in activity 2 is high enough in regard to activity 1, or if the relative unit
intrinsic return of activity 1 vis-a`-vis activity 2 is high enough. Actually, we will see
thereafter that the sign of m is the sign of the externalities.
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3 Which activity is promoted by the network?
Given that the social network conveys synergies, individual decisions will depend on
agents’ positions on the network. Moreover, as activities are competing, the position
on the network will favor only one activity. We examine thereafter how the network
shapes efforts, and in particular, whether the network promotes the same activity for
all agents or not.
The first order condition of the utility function of agent i writes as follows:
x∗i − γ
∑
j
gijx
∗
j = x0 −
λ2
c1 + c2
di(g) (3)
We restrict attention to interior equilibria.3 When γ < µ(g), the vector of Bonacich
centralities is well-defined and is written B(g; γ) =
∑+∞
k=0 γ
kgkJ , where J is the vector
of ones. Therefore, the individual Bonacich centrality can be expressed as Bi(g; γ) =∑+∞
k=0 γ
kmi(k; g), with mi(k; g) being the number of paths (including loops) of length k
from agent i to others including herself. It measures the sum of paths of all lengths to
others k, where the number of paths of length k is weighted by the decay factor γk (see
Ballester et al. [2006]). Note that Bi = 1 in the empty network. The next proposition
expresses the individual effort as a function of the Bonacich centrality of the agent in
the network with decay parameter γ:
Proposition 1 The effort in activity 1 of each agent is given by
x∗i = x0 +m ·
(
Bi(g; γ)− 1
)
(4)
The effort can therefore be expressed as the sum of the effort in autarky, x0, plus a
(net) network effect. This latter is the product of the attractiveness multiplier by the
difference between individual Bonacich measure and 1 (which is the Bonacich measure
in the empty network). Thus, the influence of the network can be decomposed in two
factors: first, the attractiveness multiplier, that can be either positive or negative, in-
dicates which activity is promoted; second, positions of agents are taken into account
3This requires that the total synergies on the network are low enough, a sufficient condition is
presented in remark 2 below.
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through Bonacich centrality measure.4 More centrality enhances effort in activity 1
when the attractiveness multiplier is positive, otherwise more centrality enhances ac-
tivity 2. Furthermore, since the attractiveness multiplier is the same for all agents,
the network fosters effort in the same activity for all. Note also that the sign of the
attractiveness multiplier is the sign of net externalities.
Remark 1. An immediate implication, related to the monotonicity of Bonacich cen-
trality with respect to link addition (see Ballester et al. [2006]), is that, given any
network g, adding any link increases either activity 1 or activity 2 for every agent.
Remark 2. In general, high synergies can result in corner solutions. To guarantee
xi ∈]0, 1[, individual Bonacich centralities have to be sufficiently low. If m ≥ 0, we
just have to check that x∗i < 1, and using equation (4), we get Bi(g; γ) <
1
m
λ1
λ1+λ2
.
If m < 0, we check that x∗i > 0 obtains if Bi(g; γ) <
1
|m|
λ2
λ1+λ2
. Since the Bonacich
centralities increase with link addition, and noticing that the Bonacich centrality of
the complete network is equal to 1
1−γ(n−1) , an interior solution obtains on any network
if γ ≤ 1
n−1
[
1− |m| · λ1+λ2
min(λ1,λ2)
]
.
Remark 3. Note that, while the RHS of the FOC given in equation (3) contains an
idiosyncratic component, efforts are expressed as a function of a non weighted Bonacich
centrality. This formulation obtains since the idiosyncratic element is proportional to
agent i’s degree.
4 How does social network react to subvention or
taxation of activities?
A policy maker interested in promoting activity 1 can alter a1 or a2.
5 An alternative
policy action consists in modifying c1 or c2, by either subsidizing activity 1 for all agents,
4This latter factor is presnt in Ballester et al. (2006), the former to our multi-activity setting.
5For instance, in the case of education, a1 may represent an individual preference for activity
1; a state may increase the expected revenue associated with education by favoring the insertion of
educated job seekers, or wages, etc. In the example of farmers, a1 may correspond to the price of
good 1; thus, a state controlling prices can increase the price of good 1.
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or by taxing activity 2.6 Importantly, altering costs affects the level of interaction, and
therefore, the network structure affects the return of such a policy. How does the social
network react to the policy of subvention or taxation?
We will first examine the issue and we will stress the role played by the elasticity of
Bonacich centrality with respect to decay. Second, we will explore some properties of
the elasticities.
4.1 How does the network react to policy intervention?
We suppose without loss of generality a modification of parameters favorable to activity
1, we consider a marginal increase of parameter p, with p = a1,−a2,−c1, c2. This
variation results in an increase of x0 and m (
∂x0
∂p
> 0, ∂m
∂p
> 0). The differentiation of
equilibrium effort with respect to any parameter p is decomposed as follows:
∂x∗i
∂p
=
∂x0
∂p︸︷︷︸
Idiosyncratic Effect
+
(
Bi(g; γ)− 1
) · ∂m
∂p︸ ︷︷ ︸
Attractiveness Effect
+m · ∂Bi(g; γ)
∂γ
∂γ
∂p︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interaction Effect︸ ︷︷ ︸
Network Effect
(5)
The induced variation of effort is the sum of an idiosyncratic effect and a network effect.
The former corresponds to the variation of effort in autarky. The latter is shaped by
two components: the variation of the attractiveness multiplier and the variation of
the centrality. Varying parameters a1 or a2 entails a positive idiosyncratic effect and
a positive network effect (attractiveness effect is positive, and there is no interaction
effect), thus the network accentuates the increase of individual efforts in activity 1 with
regard to autarky.
We consider now cost variation. For clarity of exposition, we assume m < 0 (the
case m > 0 is symmetric, see Table 1 for a summary). Consider first an increase of
c2. The three effects, autarky, attractiveness and interaction effects, are positive. We
conclude that efforts in activity 1 increase, and that the increase is larger than that
obtained under autarky. Second, consider a decrease of activity 1. Since m < 0, the
6For instance, in case of education versus leisure, a state can lower the cost of effort in education
by building bibliothecas or playgrounds, reducing transportation cost to schools, etc. In the case of
farmers, a state may subsidize production cost to encourage the adoption of a technology.
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interaction effect is negative, and the overall network effect is ambiguous: on one hand
activity 1 becomes more attractive, on the other hand the intensity of interaction γ
is enhanced, increasing Bonacich centralities and then fostering effort in activity 2.
Let i(g; γ) =
γ
Bi(g;γ)−1
∂Bi(g;γ)
∂γ
be the elasticity of agent i’s Bonacich centrality (net of
centrality in empty network) with respect to the intensity of interaction. This elasticity
has a finite value as soon as the Bonacich measure exists, and it tends to infinity as
the intensity of interaction approaches its upper limit (see Appendix 1). We obtain:
Proposition 2 Consider m < 0. Following a decrease of c1, the network effect is
negative for agents such that i(g, γ) >
−x0
m
. In contrast, increasing c2 induces a positive
network effect for all agents, irrespective of the value of the elasticity.
Proposition 2 shows that, when activity 2 is relatively more attractive than activity 1,
i.e. m < 0, increasing c2, the network provides a support to the policy aim, i.e. all
agents increase more effort in activity 1 than if they were in autarky. In opposite, de-
creasing c1, the network plays against the policy aim for agents such that the elasticity
of Bonacich centrality with respect to decay is sufficiently high.7 The following example
illustrates the possibility of obtaining negative network reaction for high elasticities.
Regular networks. Let gk denote a regular network of degree k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n− 1}, i.e.
a network in which every agent has k neighbors. We find Bi(gk; γ) =
1
1−kγ for all i,
under the condition that k < 1
γ
(here, µ(g) = 1
γ
). We deduce that i(gk; γ) =
1
1−kγ . We
define k1 =
a1−a2+c2
λ2
; note that m < 0 implies that k1 <
1
γ
. We obtain that, for any
regular network gk, L(gk; γ) = ∅ if k ≤ k1, while L(gk; γ) = N if k > k1. Hence, when
decreasing c1, the network plays against the policy aim if the network is sufficiently
dense.8
Despite the network can react negatively, the global effect of the marginal decrease
of c1 on individual effort in activity 1, taking into account of both idiosyncratic and
network effect, is unambiguous. Indeed, it can be shown that a marginal decrease
of the cost of activity 1 (resp. a marginal increase of the cost of activity
7When m > 0, subsidizing activity 1 induces a positive network reaction, while taxing activity 2
induces a negative network effect for agents with elasticity higher than 1−x0m .
8Similarly, when m > 0, let L′(g; γ) = {i ∈ N/ i(g; γ) > 1−x0m }, define k′c = c1−a1+a2λ1 , and note
that m > 0 implies that k′c <
1
γ . Then, L′(gk; γ) = ∅ if k ≤ k′c, while L′(gk; γ) = N if k > k′c.
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2) always enhances individual effort in activity 1 (proof in Appendix 1).
In particular, when the interaction effect is negative, the idiosyncratic effect always
dominates the network effect.
Thus, a policy maker that wants to promote activity 1 by affecting activity costs should
be aware of the possible negative reaction of the social network. This happens when
the network favors the activity that is not supported by the policy maker. In that case,
taxing the activity that is favored by the network induces a positive reaction of the
network for all agents.9
————————-
INSERT Table 1 here
————————-
4.2 Elasticities and networks
The previous analysis suggests that the elasticity of Bonacich centralities with respect
to decay is crucial to assess how the network reacts to a policy affecting activity costs.
We examine now how this elasticity varies with intensity of interaction and we explore
some familiar network structures. We let L(g; γ) = {i ∈ N / i(g; γ) > x0|m| ,m < 0}.
Corollary 1 Consider γ, γ′, with γ ≤ γ′. Then, L(g; γ) ⊂ L(g; γ′).
This result is driven by the increase of the elasticity with γ (see Appendix 1). More-
over, it is important to emphasize that the properties of the elasticity differ from those
of Bonacich centralities. Precisely, there is no monotonic relationship between elas-
ticities and link addition, nor systematic regularity between elasticities and Bonacich
centrality. Thus, there is no monotonic relationship between individual effort and the
sign of network reaction. We illustrate these points by examining some specific network
structures.
9Our analysis departs from traditional policy concern in presence of strategic interaction. A well-
known consequence of the presence of synergies is coordination problems, because agents have a
tendency to conform to the actions of others (Wilson [1987], Bernheim [1994]), which may stick
individual and aggregate behaviors to undesirable outcomes (Cooper and John [1988], Akerlof [1997],
Brock and Durlauf [2001]). This opens the scope for policy intervention devoted to catalyze individual
actions toward a Pareto-improving outcome.
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4-player networks. We examine the elasticities of Bonacich centralities on the six 4-
player connected architectures. Two messages appear. First, the elasticity is not always
increasing in link addition (see Table 3, the two numbers in bold for γ = 0.05). Second,
on a given network, more central agent have not always lower elasticities (see Table 3,
the two numbers in bold for γ = 0.45).
————————-
INSERT Figure 1 here
————————-
————————-
INSERT Table 2 here
————————-
————————-
INSERT Table 3 here
————————-
5 Conclusion
This article has examined the impact of the structure of a social network on individual
choices in the allocation of a scarce resource between two activities. One key feature
of the model is that the same social network conveys synergies in both activities.
We first characterize the individual effort in both activities as a function of a unique
Bonacich centrality measure, and network centrality favors the same activity for all
agents. A policy maker aiming at promoting activity 1 by subsidizing the cost of
activity 1 or taxing activity 2 should take into account the attractiveness multiplier.
Indeed, when the network favors activity 2, choosing to subsidize activity 1 can generate
a negative reaction of the network to the policy intervention, limiting policy effect. Such
counterproductive network effect occurs when elasticities of Bonacich centralities with
respect to the intensity of interaction are relatively large.
It would be interesting to test the predictions of the model.10 Further, the theoretical
model can be extended in the following directions. One may introduce heterogeneity in
10In the context of education, Calvo´-Armengol, Patacchini and Ze´nou (2009) find empirical support
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individual preferences. One may also examine the endogenous formation of the social
network.
6 Appendix 1: proofs
Proof of proposition 1. For sufficiently low value of parameter γ, this linear system
(3) is invertible, and there exists a unique equilibrium. Define column-vector z with
typical element zi = xi + m − x0. Plugging the new variable into equation (3), one
obtains zi−γ
∑
j gijzj = m. Since γ < µ(g), the system (I−γg)z = mJ is invertible (see
Debreu and Herstein [1953]) and the solution can be written as a Bonacich centrality
measure B(g; γ) =
∑∞
k=0 γ
kgkJ . The individual effort in activity 1 is thus written
xi = x0 + m ·
(
Bi(g; γ) − 1
)
. The existence of interior solutions are guaranteed by
hypothesis (see remark 2 for a sufficient condition). 
Proof that a marginal decrease of the cost of activity 1 (resp. a marginal
increase of the cost of activity 2) always enhances efforts in activity 1. We
differentiate the FOCs given in equation (3) with respect to parameters c1, c2. For
dc1 < 0, the FOCs are written
(c1 + c2)x
∗
i − (λ1 + λ2)
∑
j
gijx
∗
j = a1 − a2 + c2 − λ2di(g)
Then, dx∗ =
(− dc1
c1+c2
) · (I − γG)−1x∗, where (I − γG)−1x∗ is a well-defined weighted
Bonacich measure since γ < µ(g) (see remark 1 pp. 1409 in Ballester et al. [2006]),
and this quantity is positive since x∗ is nonnegative. As well, for dc2 > 0, we find
dx∗ =
(
dc2
c1+c2
) · (I − γG)−1(1−x∗), where (I − γG)−1(1−x∗) is a well-defined weighted
Bonacich measure, and this quantity is positive since 1− x∗ is nonnegative. 
Proof of proposition 2. Rearranging equation (5), we find that, in case of a marginal
that Bonacich centrality enhances effort in education. Our model provides conditions under which
network centrality may to some extent deter education. In particular, in Calvo´-Armengol, Patacchini
and Ze´nou (2009), the proxi for effort is performance at school. Our work suggests that if the proxi
for effort was instead the duration of activity, then, taking into account that the residual time may
also generate utility, the social network may not always enhance education.
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decrease of the cost of activity 1, the network effect is positive if and only if
m · i(g; γ) ≥ −x0 (6)
In case of a marginal increase of the cost of activity 2, the network effect is positive if
and only if
m · i(g; γ) ≤ 1− x0 (7)
Note that when m < 0 inequality (7) holds. The following proposition follows directly.

7 Appendix 2: basic properties of i
We have i(g; γ) =
γ
Bi(g;γ)−1
∂Bi(g;γ)
∂γ
. Let us denote di,q = [g
qJ ]i, for all q ≥ 1. We denote
di = di,1, choosing either of the two notations for convenience. Basically,
i(g; γ) =
∑∞
q=1 qγ
qdi,q∑∞
q=1 γ
qdi,q
(8)
 The elasticity is finite if Bonacich centrality is finite. Notice that the Bonacich
centrality is defined for all γ < µ(g). Consider some real number β > 1 and such that
βγ < µ(g). Then we will show that the series
∑
q≥1 qγ
qdi,q ≤
∑
q≥1(βγ)
qdi,q. It is
sufficient to show that there exists some integer q0 such that q ≤ βq for any q ≥ q0.
This means 1
ln(β)
ln(q) < q for any q ≥ q0. This basically holds for some q0. 
 The elasticity tends to infinity as γ tends to µ(g). We will see that for any real
number A, limγ→γ¯ i(g; γ) > A. We have:
i(g; γ) =
Bi − 1
Bi
+
Bi − (1 + γdi)
Bi
+
Bi − (1 + γdi + γ2di,2)
Bi
+ · · ·
Hence, for any integer A˜, we have i(g; γ) ≥ ˜i with
˜i =
Bi − 1
Bi
+
Bi − (1 + γdi)
Bi
+
Bi − (1 + γdi + γ2di,2)
Bi
+ · · ·+ Bi − (
∑A˜
k=0 γ
kdi,k)
Bi
Now, ˜i writes:
˜i = A˜− A˜
Bi
− (A˜− 1)γdi
Bi
− (A˜− 2)γ
2di,2
Bi
− · · · − γ
A˜di,γ
Bi
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and since limγ→γ¯ Bi(g; γ) = +∞, we obtain that limγ→γ¯ ˜i = A˜. Hence, taking A˜ ≥ A,
it stems that limγ→γ¯ ˜i > A, and the result follows. 
 The elasticity is increasing in γ. We have ∂i
∂γ
> 0 if and only if
(Bi − 1)
(
∂Bi
∂γ
+ γ
∂2Bi
∂γ2
)
− γ
(
∂Bi
∂γ
)2
> 0
This means (∑
k≥1
γkdi,k
)(∑
k≥1
k2γk−1di,k
)
− γ
(∑
k≥1
kγk−1di,k
)2
> 0
We remark that coefficients of elements
(
di,k
)2
are null for all k. Concerning the term
di,k · di,l, the coefficient is written (k + l)2γk+l−1, and is thus positive. 
8 Appendix 3: 4-player connected architectures
This appendix presents Bonacich centralities and their respective elasticities with re-
spect to decay - as defined in equation (8) -, for all 4-player connected architectures.
 The circle. For all i, BCirclei = 11−2γ , and Circlei = Bi.
 The complete network. For all i, BCompletei = 11−3γ , and 
Complete
i = Bi.
 The line network with links 12, 23, 34.
BLine1 = B
Line
4 =
1+γ−γ2
1−3γ2+γ4 , B
Line
2 = B
Line
3 =
1+2γ−γ3
1−3γ2+γ4 .
Line1 = 
Line
4 =
1+4γ+3γ2−4γ3−3γ4+2γ5
(1−3γ2+γ4)(1+2γ−γ3) , 
Line
2 = 
Line
3 =
2+6γ+3γ2−4γ3−3γ4+γ6
(1−3γ2+γ4)(2+3γ−γ2−γ3) .
 The star network with links 12, 13, 14.
BStar1 =
1+3γ
1−3γ2 , B
Star
k =
1+γ
1−3γ2 for k = 2, 3, 4.
Star1 =
1+2γ+3γ2
(1−3γ2)(1+γ) , 
Star
k =
1+6γ+3γ2
(1−3γ2)(1+3γ) for k = 2, 3, 4.
 The T network with links 12, 23, 24, 34.
BT1 =
1+γ−γ2−γ3
1−4γ2−2γ3+γ4 , B
T
2 =
1+3γ+γ2−γ3
1−4γ2−2γ3+γ4 , B
T
3 = B
T
4 =
1+2γ+γ2
1−4γ2−2γ3+γ4 .
T1 =
1+6γ+7γ2−γ4+2γ5+γ6
(1+3γ+γ2−γ3)(1−4γ2−2γ3+γ4) , 
T
2 =
3+10γ+15γ2+8γ3−3γ4−2γ5+γ6
(3+5γ+γ2−γ3)(1−4γ2−2γ3+γ4) , 
T
3 = 
T
4 =
2+10γ+14γ2+4γ3−4γ4−2γ5
(2+5γ+2γ2−γ3)(1−4γ2−2γ3+γ4) .
 The Almost complete network with links 12, 13, 23, 24, 34.
14
BA1 = B
A
4 =
1+2γ+γ2
1−5γ2−4γ3 , B
A
2 = B
A
3 =
1+3γ+2γ2
1−5γ2−4γ3 .
A1 = 
A
4 =
2+12γ+22γ2+16γ3+4γ4
(2+6γ+4γ2)(1−5γ2−4γ3) , 
A
2 = 
A
3 =
3+14γ+27γ2+24γ3+8γ4
(3+7γ+4γ2)(1−5γ2−4γ3) .
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FIGURES AND TABLES.
decrease c1 increase c2
m > 0 m < 0 m > 0 m < 0
Idiosyncratic Effect (+) (+) (+) (+)
Attractiveness Effect (+) (+) (+) (+)
Interaction Effect (+) (−) (−) (+)
Network Effect (+) (+) iff i(g; γ) ≤ −x0m (+) iff i(g; γ) ≤ 1−x0m (+)
Effort in activity 1 ↗ xi ↗ xi ↗ xi ↗ xi
Table 1: Summary
γ BCircle BLine1 B
Line
2 B
Star
1 B
Star
2 B
T
1 B
T
2 B
T
3 B
A
1 B
A
2 B
Complete
0.01 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.03
0.05 1.11 1.05 1.10 1.15 1.05 1.05 1.16 1.11 1.11 1.17 1.17
0.1 1.25 1.12 1.23 1.34 1.13 1.13 1.36 1.26 1.27 1.39 1.42
0.15 1.42 1.20 1.38 1.55 1.23 1.24 1.62 1.46 1.51 1.71 1.81
0.2 1.66 1.31 1.57 1.81 1.36 1.39 1.97 1.74 1.87 2.18 2.50
0.25 2.00 1.45 1.81 2.15 1.53 1.62 2.48 2.16 2.50 3.00 4.00
0.3 2.50 1.63 2.13 2.60 1.78 1.99 3.30 2.84 3.82 4.70 10.00
0.35 3.33 1.89 2.55 3.24 2.13 2.69 4.84 4.14 8.43 10.62
0.4 5.00 2.27 3.18 4.23 2.69 4.56 8.91 7.60
0.45 10.00 2.87 4.17 5.98 3.69 23.71 50.48 43.12
0.5 4.00 6.00 10.00 6.00
0.55 6.77 10.50 28.64 16.75
0.6 25.00 40.00
Table 2: Bonacich centralities
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γ Circle Line1 
Line
2 
Star
1 
Star
2 
T
1 
T
2 
T
3 
A
1 
A
2 
Complete
0.01 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.03
0.05 1.11 1.10 1.08 1.06 1.14 1.15 1.09 1.13 1.16 1.13 1.17
0.1 1.25 1.22 1.18 1.15 1.29 1.33 1.23 1.30 1.37 1.32 1.42
0.15 1.42 1.36 1.30 1.27 1.45 1.54 1.42 1.51 1.66 1.60 1.81
0.2 1.66 1.53 1.45 1.43 1.64 1.83 1.69 1.80 2.09 2.02 2.50
0.25 2.00 1.74 1.65 1.66 1.89 2.26 2.10 2.23 2.83 2.75 4.00
0.3 2.50 2.01 1.91 1.97 2.21 2.93 2.78 2.91 4.37 4.28 10.00
0.35 3.33 2.38 2.27 2.42 2.67 4.22 4.06 4.21 9.72 9.63
0.4 5.00 2.92 2.80 3.13 3.39 7.64 7.47 7.63
0.45 10.00 3.77 3.64 4.40 4.67 42.67 42.52 42.68
0.5 5.33 5.20 7.33 7.60
0.55 9.18 9.04 20.97 21.24
0.6 34.37 34.23
Table 3: Elasticities of Bonacich centralities with respect to γ
Figure 1: The six 4-player connected architectures
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